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 Going Hard and Going Early in New Zealand: The 
“Team of 5 Million” Unites Against COVID-19 
 
Key takeaways 
 
1. New Zealand (NZ) became the first country to reach 100 days free of community 
transmission of COVID-19. Although the demography of the coronavirus cases in NZ 
is broadly consistent with international experience – e.g. deaths are highest among 
those aged 60+ years – critical differences with other countries are apparent given 
the successful curtailment of transmission. 
2. The NZ Government took early epidemiological modelling estimates seriously and 
adopted a “Go hard, and Go Early” strategy, which has (to-date) worked. This 
included the introduction of a four-level COVID-19 alert system, initially implemented 
nationally and more recently applied regionally following identification of the “August 
Auckland Cluster”. 
3. Clear, consistent communication has been vital to the NZ response; the “Team of 5 
million” have united against COVID-19 was the simple slogan adopted by the 
Government, preferring sporting rather than warlike analogies to help create social 
cohesion. Additionally, explainers and cartoons have proven effective communication 
tools in reaching the public. 
4. The NZ Government listens to the scientific advice it receives. However, their 
response times are sometimes slower than scientists would prefer. Examples 
include: the low uptake of COVID-19 tests in the community and the Government’s 
under-capacity to contact trace at scale. 
5. An economic support package from the Government, alongside their public health 
strategies, have led to a quicker recovery of the economy than some countries, 
although tourism remains problematic. Strong leadership, with clear messaging, and 
building a sense of unity, have been vital elements in NZ’s largely effective response 
to COVID-19. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
New Zealand’s (NZ) Government was 
quick to respond to the initial 
announcement by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) in March 2020 that 
the COVID-19 outbreak was a pandemic. 
Their strategy was to “go hard and go 
early”; to be informed by scientific 
evidence and to ensure their approach 
was supported by a communication 
strategy that sought to engender high 
levels of public co-operation despite 
restrictive public health measures. New 
Zealand became the first country in the 
world to reach 100 days free of community 
transmission of SARS-CoV-2. 
 
In this policy briefing, we first outline the 
demographic composition of COVID-19 
cases in NZ, before highlighting the 4-
level alert system adopted by the NZ 
Government in their management of the 
pandemic and the overarching strategy 
that underpinned their response. The 
critical role of effective communication and 
social cohesion is subsequently explored. 
The final sections then reflect upon the 
measures taken to mitigate the economic 
impacts of COVID-19 in NZ and offer 
some concluding reflections for the 
Liverpool City Region (LCR). 
 
 
2. The demography of COVID-19 in 
New Zealand 
The NZ Ministry of Health’s website 
provides a comprehensive demographic 
profile of COVID-19 cases and tests. 
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Overall, the patterns are broadly 
consistent with international experience: 
most cases have been among those aged 
20-59 years, and deaths among those 
aged 60+ years.  Two-thirds were 
imported or close contacts of imported 
cases: 39% of cases (n=1,714 confirmed 
and probable as at 28 August 2020), were 
among people that had travelled 
internationally within 14 days of onset, and 
a further 28% were their close contacts. 
By June 8, when the last case in the first 
coronavirus wave was discharged from 
isolation, there had been 1504 cases and 
22 deaths. There were 617 cases located 
within 16 significant COVID-19 clusters 
(defined as 10 or more cases linked to the 
same source) during the first wave. 
Overseas travellers provided the pathway 
into NZ for 10 of the clusters. A further 
Five of the clusters were located in aged 
residential care facilities, and most of the 
22 deaths to date were linked to just two 
of these.  
 
Internationally, there is evidence that 
some ethnic groups are especially 
vulnerable to COVID-19. Largely due to 
the fact that most cases were detected in 
travellers returning from China, the US 
and Europe, or their close contacts, rates 
of COVID-19 disease among Māori (the 
indigenous people of NZ) and Pacific 
Peoples were low (9% and 8% 
respectively). A shift in transmission to 
less privileged populations was curtailed 
by the rapid imposition of the Alert Level 
Four lockdown. This move also 
contributed to low hospitalisation rates. 
While there were proportionally fewer 
cases of COVID-19 among Pacific People 
and Māori, the rates per 1,000 of tests for 
COVID-19 were much higher among 
these groups, suggesting that 
communities took the public health 
messages about their vulnerability 
seriously and acted appropriately.  
 
On 11 August, a household cluster of four 
new cases was confirmed in Auckland, the 
source of which is currently unknown. At 
present, this cluster comprises more than 
100 cases largely among Pacific People 
and Māori.  
 
3. Go Hard, and Go Early  
 
The NZ Government’s approach to 
manage the COVID-19 epidemic has been 
communicated as “Go Hard, and Go 
Early”. On 3 February, NZ temporarily 
banned the entry of foreign visitors from, 
or those who had travelled through, 
mainland China. New Zealand citizens 
were exempt, but were required to self-
isolate for 14 days on return to the 
country. Around the same time, the 
Government chartered an aircraft to 
enable over 150 citizens based in Hubei 
Province, China, to return, and on arrival 
were placed in a government-managed 
quarantine facility for two weeks. The first 
case of COVID-19 in Aotearoa NZ was 
notified to the Ministry of Health on 28 
February, and the foreign travel ban was 
extended to include Iran (the origin of 
travel of the first case) followed by 
northern Italy and South Korea.  
 
As the number of COVID-19 cases 
increased rapidly during March, early 
modelling estimates reported a worse-
case scenario in which over 60% of NZ’s 
population would have symptomatic 
illness, of whom 146,000 would require 
hospitalisation, 36,600 would require 
critical care and 27,600 would be 
expected to die (Wilson 2020). Another 
study explored the impact that either a 
mitigation or a suppression strategy would 
have on the incidence of COVID-19 cases 
and more importantly its impact on 
Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds across the 
country (James et al. 2020). The 
mitigation approach assumed that the 
pandemic would continue in the 
community at a controlled rate, while 
ensuring healthcare systems were not at 
peak demand and, over time, herd 
immunity would develop and the virus 
would stop circulating. This strategy used 
a combination of low-level control (e.g. 
household quarantine and case isolation) 
combined with periods of greater 
restriction (as required) to ensure 
healthcare settings are kept below 
capacity.  
 
By contrast, the suppression strategy 
included a series of controls designed to 
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progressively reduce the basic 
reproduction number (R0) from 2.5 with no 
intervention to 0.75 if schools/universities 
closed; cases were isolated and affected 
households quarantined; and physical 
distancing was universal. The suppression 
scenario therefore aimed to minimise the 
occurrence of new cases of COVID-19 for 
as long as possible, and required effective 
controls to be implemented early (James 
et al. 2020).  
 
Implementing alert levels nationally 
 
The NZ Government took these modelling 
estimates seriously. Their response was 
to introduce a four-level alert system (Te 
Kawanatanga o Aotearoa New Zealand 
Government 2020a), which introduced a 
range of restrictions according to the 
likelihood that SARS-Cov-2 virus was 
being transmitted within the community – 
see Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. New Zealand COVID-19 Alert Levels Summary  
 
Alert Level Risk Assessment 
Level 4 – Lockdown  
Likely the disease is not contained 
• Sustained and intensive community 
transmission is occurring  
• Widespread outbreaks 
Level 3 – Restrict  
High risk the disease is not contained 
• Multiple cases of community 
transmission occurring 
• Multiple active clusters in multiple 
regions 
Level 2 – Reduce  
The disease is contained, but the risk of 
community transmission remains 
• Limited community transmission could 
be occurring 
• Active clusters in more than one region 
Level 1 – Prepare  
The disease is contained in NZ 
• COVID-19 is uncontrolled overseas 
• Sporadic imported cases 
• Isolated local transmission could be 
occurring in NZ 
 
Source: Adapted from New Zealand COVID-19 Alert Levels Summary 
 
 
Supermarkets, petrol stations, health care 
facilities and utilities were deemed 
essential services and remain open at all 
Alert Levels. The NZ Prime Minister, 
Jacinda Ardern, also mandated that the 
Tooth Fairy and the Easter Bunny were 
considered essential services. However, 
in a media statement she acknowledged 
that due to supply chain issues, the Easter 
 
Policy Briefing 024             Page 5 
Bunny may not be able to visit every 
house.  
 
The NZ Government implemented the 
Alert Level system rapidly, moving into 
Alert Level 2 on 21 March, Level 3 on 23 
March, and Alert Level 4 on 25 March 
2020. At that time, there were 155 active 
cases being managed in isolation and 
around 40-60 new cases were being 
announced per day. By 27 April, when NZ 
moved back from Alert Level 4 to Level 2, 
the total number of cases and deaths was 
1469 and 19, respectively, but the number 
of new cases had reduced significantly to 
about 5 per day. The return to Alert Level 
1 on 8 June coincided with the last known 
case (at that time) being released from 
isolation.  
 
Regionalising alert levels implementation  
 
New Zealand was the first country in the 
world to be free from COVID-19 in the 
community for 100 days. While there still 
remained a trickle of new cases on most 
days, all were among citizens returning 
home at the border on arrival or soon after 
while in quarantine facilities. However, 
upon confirmation of an emerging 
Auckland Cluster on 11 August, the 
Government regionalised the Alert Levels, 
with the Auckland region (comprising 
approximately 1.6 million residents) 
moving to Alert Level 3, and the rest of the 
country into Alert Level 2. People living in 
aged residential care units across the 
country were moved to Alert Level 4, 
given their heightened risk of succumbing 
to COVID-19 if infected.  
  
It is worth noting that a regional approach 
to lockdown was proposed by the National 
Crisis Management Centre (NCMC) 
during the first wave of COVID-19. The 
NCMC proposed using the existing 16 civil 
defence regions (broadly consistent with 
council boundaries (cf. unitary authorities 
in England), along with 84 “control points” 
such as road intersections, which could be 
used to restrict travel between regions. 
The initial proposal was rejected by the 
NZ Government, as the regional 
lockdowns would be logistically complex 
to administer and would have substantial 
adverse economic impacts. Furthermore, 
there was a risk that a regional approach 
would risk diminishing the widespread 
strong public support. 
  
The current “August Auckland Cluster” is 
largely connected to a single household, 
and predominantly contained within the 
Auckland region, with a handful of close 
contacts based in the neighbouring 
Waikato region. For these reasons, a 
regional approach to lockdown was 
deemed appropriate. The Auckland region 
is home to a third of NZ’s population, 
many of whom are extremely mobile. For 
example, while the origin of this cluster is 
in South Auckland, subsequent cases 
reported having visited shops or used 
public transport more than 20km away. 
“Going hard, and going early”, and 
restricting the movement of Aucklanders, 
was deemed to be a pragmatic response: 
the cluster could be contained while the 
remainder of the economy could continue.  
 
At the time of writing (28 August 2020), 
there had been a total of 1714 cases: 
1363 confirmed (the number reported to 
the WHO) and 351 probable cases of 
COVID-19 in NZ, of whom 1561 had 
recovered, and 22 had died. There were 
131 active cases, 11 of which were in 
hospital. 
 
 
4. Communication and social 
cohesion 
Clear and consistent messaging by the 
Prime Minister, the Director General of 
Health, and researchers was critical to 
gaining public support for the NZ 
Government’s strategy for managing 
COVID-19. At the outset, the 
communications strategy was not to 
gather recruits to wage war against 
coronavirus, but to create social cohesion, 
with a simple slogan: “Unite against 
COVID-19”. Recognising that many New 
Zealanders are passionate about sport, 
the Government also adopted sporting 
analogies, referring to our country as the 
“Team of 5 Million”.  
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On 11 August, when the Prime Minister 
announced that Auckland was moving to 
Alert Level 3 while the rest of the country 
remained at Level 2, the unity of our team 
came into question from the media. The 
Prime Minister’s team analogy continued, 
commenting that not all players are on the 
field at the same time, and that “1.5 million 
New Zealanders in our biggest city are 
carrying a heavy load for our team of 5 
million right now” (Cheng 2020). Following 
comments on social media making 
malicious claims about people in the 
current COVID-19 cluster, the Director-
General of Health responded with a 
statement that aptly summarises the 
Government’s approach to addressing 
issues: “there is no blame or shame in 
having COVID-19. The virus is the 
problem, not the people”. 
 
Key public health messages (wash hands, 
stay home, physical distancing) have been 
widely advertised across the media 
(SiteSafe Te Kaitiaki o Haumaru 2020; Te 
Kawanatanga o Aotearoa New Zealand 
Government 2020b). Each message also 
reminded the public to be kind. Kindness 
to others and our collective wellbeing were 
reiterated at the daily televised press 
briefings in which the Prime Minister and 
Director General of Health would update 
the country with the new COVID-19 
related statistics. On a regular basis, the 
Prime Minister would recognise a 
particular group (doctors or nurses, lab 
testing staff, the New Zealand Sign 
Language interpreters, and cleaners etc) 
and thank them for their service.  
 
Additionally, a number of very simple, 
effective tools have been developed over 
time, either to communicate different 
aspects of the Government’s strategy of 
eliminating COVID-19, or to relay key 
evidence-based messages. For example, 
“the bubble” analogy was devised initially 
with people living with disabilities in mind 
in order to protect them from wider 
community exposure (Franks 2020). The 
messaging was clear: to build your 
bubble, decide who is in it (i.e. your 
household, carers, support workers) and 
be sure to let them know; keep the size of 
the bubble as small as practicably 
possible; and, to prevent the virus from 
spreading, make sure that you don’t pop 
the bubble (i.e. avoid physical interaction 
with people outside of your bubble). 
 
Since March, microbiologist Associate 
Professor Siouxsie Wiles and cartoonist 
Toby Morris have collaborated to create a 
series of COVID-19 explainers. Based on 
the latest international evidence, their 
articles have been instrumental in 
conveying key messages simply and in an 
engaging way. Their first collaboration, 
introducing readers to epidemic curves 
and why flattening the curve is vital for 
reducing demand on healthcare facilities, 
went viral on social media – see Figure 2. 
Subsequent explainers and cartoons have 
included descriptions of COVID-19 
symptoms; why face masks are critical in 
reducing community transmission; how 
vaccines are made; and, most recently, 
the difference between close and casual 
contacts. Their graphics have been 
translated into te reo Māori, a number of 
Pacific and other languages, and have 
been adapted internationally by 
governments and organisations as part of 
their own official pandemic 
communications.  
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Figure 2. ”Flatten the Curve” by Toby Morris and Siouxsie Wiles, for thespinoff.co.nz     
 
 
The Ministry of Health and Ministry for 
Business, Innovation and Employment 
websites have been key sources of 
reliable health and business-related 
information, and updated on a regular 
basis. In addition, other government 
agencies, industry and commercial 
organisations (e.g. construction, Unions, 
airlines, and supermarkets) have been 
active in promoting key messages – while 
adapting  their processes and procedures 
– to their members and customers. 
 
These examples highlight many of the 
successful interventions that have been 
implemented and led to NZ’s enviable 
position internationally. However, it would 
be remiss not to stress the Government’s  
slow adoption of evidence-based 
recommendations at times. Examples 
include: the low uptake of COVID-19 tests 
in the community and the government’s 
under-capacity to contact trace at scale. A 
more recent example relates to the 
Government’s delayed promotion of 
wearing face masks. Indeed, the current 
guidance (as of August 24) for Alert Level 
3 is that individuals are strongly 
encouraged to wear a face covering (e.g. 
masks, scarves and bandanas) when 
outside their home and in a place where 
it’s hard to stay 2 metres away from 
others, like on public transport or in a 
shop. While the NZ Government’s current 
guidance aligns with a recent WHO 
statement on face masks, calls for 
widespread masking were made by local 
medical professionals and scientists in 
June (Kvalsvig et al. 2020). 
 
 
5. Mitigating the economic impacts 
of COVID-19 
 
The first sustained period of lockdown had 
immense adverse economic impacts. The 
Minister of Finance, Grant Robertson, 
initially announced a NZ $12 Billion 
economic recovery package, later 
expanded to $50 Billion, as part of the 
2020 Budget. Some of the initiatives in the 
recovery package included increasing the 
core government welfare benefits by $25 
per week, and doubling the winter energy 
payments (targeted at older people to 
encourage them to heat their homes). 
Businesses were supported through 
changes to business tax, as well as a 
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government-sponsored finance scheme, 
which provides small and medium 
enterprises a term loan or revolving credit 
facility for cash-flow, capital assets and 
projects responding to, or recovering from, 
the impacts of COVID-19.  
 
The most significant contribution was a 
wage subsidy scheme, in which 
employers who met specific criteria 
receive a bulk payment to cover 12 weeks 
of subsidy for each employee in their 
workforce. In addition, targeted relief 
packages have been provided to various 
sectors (construction, tourism, health, 
aviation) and community groups (e.g. 
Māori, Pacific Peoples, NGOs providing 
essential support services, and sports 
organisations).  
 
The future of the NZ economy hinges on 
the speed with which businesses can 
return to their pre-COVID levels of activity. 
While agricultural production and the 
technology sectors are flourishing, income 
from tourism – previously a major revenue 
earner for NZ – has fallen precipitously, 
and with it rising unemployment and the 
threat of poverty and widening inequality, 
all drivers of long-term adverse health 
impacts. 
 
 
6. Concluding thoughts, plus 
reflections for the Liverpool City 
Region 
 
New Zealand’s approach to managing the 
COVID-19 pandemic has attracted global 
interest. Following the recent resurgence 
of community transmission, it appears that 
the Go Hard, and Go Early strategy is 
once again proving to be successful. 
Recent restrictions enforced in Liverpool, 
such as the suspension of care home 
visits, cancellations of public events and 
gatherings and the closure of community 
buildings following the most recent 
outbreak of COVID-19, are comparable to 
those associated with Alert Levels 3 and 4 
in NZ. We hope that these measures, 
together with physical distancing, wearing 
face coverings and regular hand-washing 
can help suppress the virus in the LCR.  
Building community cohesion against 
COVID-19 is vital. Some of the 
approaches we have outlined above are 
applicable to contexts such as the LCR. 
What key reflections can be drawn out 
from our experience for the LCR? First, 
use a slogan or slogans that builds 
community strength against COVID-19, 
and identify high-profile “Team Liverpool” 
residents to spread the message, as was 
done in NZ. The key here is to remind 
Liverpudlians (and all those living and 
working within the City Region) that the 
virus is the issue, not the person who gets 
the illness.  
 
Second, encourage everyone (especially 
Government officials AND the media) who 
talks about COVID-19 to use affirmative 
language when referring to cases. 
Consider a situation when you need to 
test a vulnerable community. To “target” 
that group is to (inadvertently) lay blame 
or an element of mistrust toward them. By 
contrast, the use of empowering or 
inclusive language, such as “protect” or 
“support”, and being respectful of the 
demographic will likely be more effective 
at encouraging the uptake of testing 
among the community.  
 
Third, the LCR is home to numerous 
experts in medicine, epidemiology, public 
health, vaccinology, psychology and 
geography. Engaging a group of scientists 
to ensure that the latest scientific evidence 
is accessible to both LCR decision-makers 
and the community, can help build trust 
and confidence in the strategy being 
adopted, and ensure its long-term 
effectiveness – the COVID-19 Policy 
Briefs series being a case in point.   
 
Strong leadership, with clear messaging, 
and building a sense of unity upon a 
foundation of support for each other 
through tough times, have been vital 
elements in NZ’s largely effective 
response to COVID-19. It is important to 
note, however, that there have been 
several matters for concern along the way, 
such as those highlighted above. The NZ 
Government’s response to each bump in 
the road is to adopt a “learning by doing” 
approach. As the Prime Minister stated at 
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a recent media briefing: “that there are 
constantly things that we can and should 
be improving with our COVID 
response…and when we have identified 
gaps or issues we have moved at speed 
to fill them” (Cheng 2020b).   
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